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Abstract
We present a robust decision support framework with computa-
tional algorithms for decision makers in non-cooperative sequential
setups. Existing simulation based approaches can be inefficient when
there is a large number of feasible decisions and uncertain outcomes.
Hence, we provide a novel alternative to solve non-cooperative sequen-
tial games based on augmented probability simulation. We propose
approaches to approximate subgame perfect equilibria under complete
information, assess the robustness of such solutions and, finally, ap-
proximate adversarial risk analysis solutions when lacking complete
information. This framework could be especially beneficial in appli-
cation domains such as cybersecurity and counter-terrorism.
Keywords: Sequential decision analysis, Noncooperative games, Augmented
probability simulation.
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1 Introduction
Non-cooperative game theory refers to conflict situations in which two or
more agents make decisions whose payoffs depend on the actions implemented
by all of them and, possibly, on some random outcomes. Under complete in-
formation about the agents’ preferences and beliefs, the analysis is usually
done through Nash equilibria and related methods, which provide a predic-
tion of the agents’ decisions. Heap and Varoufakis (2004) present an in-depth
critical assessment. On the other hand, games with incomplete information
correspond to cases where the agents do not possess full information about
their opponents and are traditionally dealt with Bayes Nash equilibria (BNE)
concepts (Harsanyi 1967). Adversarial risk analysis (ARA) is an alternative
decision analytic approach (Banks et al. 2015) relaxing the standard common
prior hypothesis in BNE (Antos and Pfeffer 2010). It provides prescriptive
support to one of the agents based on a subjective expected utility model
treating the adversaries’ decisions as uncertainties.
In this paper, our realm will be within algorithmic decision (Rossi and
Tsoukias 2009) and game (Nisan et al. 2007) theories, proposing methods
to approximate solutions for non-cooperative games with high dimensional
decision sets. Simulation based approaches can be utilized for cases where an-
alytical solutions are not available or are computationally expensive. Among
those, Monte Carlo (MC) methods are straightforward and widely imple-
mented. However, they can be inefficient when there is a large number of
alternatives, as in counter-terrorism and cybersecurity problems which may
involve thousands of possible decisions and large uncertainties about the goals
and resources of attackers (Zhuang and Bier 2007).
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Procedures such as importance sampling that focus on high-probability
high-impact events could improve the estimation by decreasing its variance.
However, an optimization problem still needs to be solved. As an alterna-
tive, Bielza et al. (1999) introduced augmented probability simulation (APS)
to approximate optimal solutions in decision analytic problems. APS trans-
forms the problem into a grand simulation in the joint space of both decision
and random variables. It constructs an auxiliary augmented distribution
(from now on, the augmented distribution) proportional to the product of
the utility function and the original distribution, such that the mode of the
marginal over the decisions of the augmented distribution coincides with the
optimal decision alternative. Thus, simulation from the augmented proba-
bility model, allows to perform the estimation and optimization tasks simul-
taneously.
This paper presents a robust decision support framework with novel APS
based computational algorithms for decision makers in non-cooperative se-
quential games. Sections 2 and 3 provide approaches to approximate sub-
game perfect equilibria under complete information, assessing their robust-
ness and, finally, approximate ARA solutions under incomplete information.
A computational assessment and the solution of a cybersecurity case study
are presented in Sections 4 and 5. The paper concludes with a discussion in
Section 6. The code to reproduce the results is available in a GitHub repos-
itory (Torres-Barra´n and Naveiro 2019). Proofs of propositions, additional
results and algorithms relevant in particular settings, as well as details of the
cybersecurity case study, are presented in the appendices.
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2 Sequential non-cooperative games with com-
plete information
This section focuses on computational methods for finding equilibria in se-
quential non-cooperative games with complete information. These games
have received various names including sequential defend-attack (Brown et al.
2006) and Stackelberg games (Gibbons 1992). As an example, consider a
company that must determine the cybersecurity controls to deploy given
that a hacker could observe them and launch a distributed denial-of-service
(DDoS) attack.
Thus, we assume a Defender (D, she) who chooses her defense d ∈ D.
Then, an Attacker (A, he) chooses his attack a ∈ A, after having observed
d. Both D and A are assumed finite, unless noted. Figure 1 shows the cor-
responding bi-agent influence diagram (Banks et al. 2015). Arc D-A reflects
that the Attacker observes the Defender’s decision. The consequences for
both agents depend on the outcome θ ∈ Θ of the attack. The agents have
their own assessment on the outcome probability, respectively pD(θ |d, a) and
pA(θ | d, a), dependent on d and a. The Defender’s utility function uD(d, θ)
depends on her chosen defense and the attack result. Similarly, the Attacker’s
utility function is uA(a, θ).
If the game is under complete information, the basic game-theoretic so-
lution does not require the Attacker to know the Defender’s probabilities
and utilities, as he observes her actions. However, the Defender must know
(uA, pA), the common knowledge assumption in this case. Then both agents’
expected utilities are computed at node Θ, ψA(d, a) =
∫
uA(a, θ) pA(θ|d, a) dθ
and ψD(d, a) =
∫
uD(d, θ) pD(θ | d, a) dθ. Next, the Attacker’s best re-
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Figure 1: Basic two player sequential defend-attack game. White nodes affect
solely the Defender; grey nodes affect only the Attacker; striped nodes affect
both agents.
sponse to D’s This is used to find the Defender’s optimal action d∗GT =
arg maxd∈D ψD(d, a
∗(d)). The pair (d∗GT, a
∗(d∗GT)) is a Nash equilibrium and,
indeed, a sub-game perfect equilibrium (Heap and Varoufakis 2004).
The solution of such games requires solving a bilevel optimization problem
(Bard 1991). These can rarely be solved analytically other than the explicit
enumeration applied to simple models. Indeed, even extremely simple in-
stances of bilevel problems have been shown to be NP-hard (Jeroslow 1985).
Thus, numerical techniques are required. A variety of methods are available
see e.g. Nisan et al. (2007). In particular, several classical and evolutionary
approaches have been proposed, as reviewed by Sinha et al. (2018). When
the inner problem adheres to certain regularity conditions, it is possible to
reduce the bilevel optimization problem to a single level one replacing the
inner problem with its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (Gordon and
Tibshirani 2012). Then, evolutionary techniques could be used to solve this
single-level problem, thus making possible to relax the upper level require-
ments. As this single-level reduction is not generally feasible, several other
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approaches have been proposed, such as nested evolutionary algorithms or
metamodeling-based methods. Most of these approaches lack scalability:
increasing the number of upper level variables produces an exponential in-
crease on the number of lower level tasks required. However, problems in
emerging areas such as cybersecurity and adversarial machine learning (Rı´os
Insua et al. 2019) may require dealing with high dimensional and/or contin-
uous decision spaces, and, consequently, can hardly be solved using standard
methods. Some scalable gradient based solution approaches have been re-
cently introduced (Naveiro and Insua 2019). However, they are restricted to
games in which expected utilities can be computed analytically. When this
is not the case, MC simulation methods, see e.g. Ponsen et al. (2011) and
Johanson et al. (2012) for pointers, could be used as briefly described next.
2.1 Monte Carlo simulation for games
Simulation based methods for sequential games typically approximate ex-
pected utilities using MC and, then, optimize with respect to decision alter-
natives, first to approximate Attacker’s best responses, then to approximate
the optimal defense. Algorithm 1 reflects a generic MC based approach to
solve non-cooperative games where Q and P are the sample sizes required
to respectively approximate the expected utilities ψA(d, a) and ψD(d, a) to
the desired precision, as discussed in B.1. Convergence of the Algorithm
1, detailed in B.1, follows under mild conditions and is based on two ap-
plications (for the inner and outer loops within Algorithm 1) of a uniform
version of the strong law of large numbers (SLLN) (Jennrich 1969). It shows
uniform convergence to the expected utilities as well as to the attacker’s best
responses and defender’s optimal decision.
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input: P , Q
for d ∈ D do
for a ∈ A do
Generate samples θ1, . . . , θQ ∼ pA(θ | d, a)
Compute ψ̂A(d, a) =
1
Q
∑
i uA(a, θi)
Find a∗(d) = arg maxa ψ̂A(d, a)
Generate samples θ1, . . . , θP ∼ pD(θ | d, a∗(d))
Compute ψ̂D(d) =
1
P
∑
i uD(d, θi)
Compute d̂∗GT = arg maxd ψ̂D(d)
Algorithm 1: MC approach for non-cooperative sequential games with
complete information
From a computational perspective, the algorithm requires generating |D|×
(|A| × Q + P ) samples, where | · | designates the cardinality of the corre-
sponding set, in addition to the cost of the final optimization and |D| inner
loop optimizations. When the decision sets are continuous, they need to be
discretized to solve the problem to the desired precision, as exemplified in
Section 4.2. In the end, MC approaches could turn out to be computation-
ally expensive when dealing with decision dependent uncertainties, as is the
case in the games in this study: they require sampling from pD(θ | d, a) and
pA(θ | d, a) for each possible pair of d and a, entailing loops over the decision
spaces D and A. When these are high dimensional, considering the whole
decision space as in MC will typically be inefficient. APS mitigates this issue.
2.2 Augmented probability simulation for games
APS solves for maximization of expected utility by converting the tasks of
sequential estimation and optimization into simulation from an augmented
distribution in the joint space of decisions and outcomes, not requiring a sep-
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arate optimization step. Bielza et al. (1999) introduced it to solve decision
analysis problems and Ekin et al. (2014) extended it to solve constrained
stochastic optimization models. It can be advantageous in problems with
expected utility surfaces that are expensive to estimate rendering the opti-
mization step inefficient. This paper first uses APS to solve sequential games
dealing with the Attacker’s and Defender’s decision problems sequentially.
For the Attacker, we introduce an augmented distribution piA(a, θ |d) over
(a, θ) for a given defender action d, defined as proportional to the product
of the utility function and the original distribution, uA(a, θ) pA(θ | d, a). If
uA(a, θ) is positive and uA(a, θ) pA(θ | d, a) is integrable, then piA(a, θ | d) is
a well-defined distribution. Simulating from it solves simultaneously for the
expectation of the objective function and its optimization since its marginal
over actions a, given by piA(a | d) =
∫
piA(a, θ | d)dθ, is proportional to
the Attacker’s expected utility ψA(d, a) =
∫
uA(a, θ) pA(θ | d, a) dθ. Con-
sequently, the Attacker’s best response given d can be computed as a∗(d) =
mode [piA(a | d)]. Using backward induction, and assuming that uD(d, θ)
is positive and uD(d, θ)pD(θ | d, a) is integrable, the Defender’s problem is
solved sampling from the augmented distribution piD(d, θ | a∗(d)) ∝ uD(d, θ)
pD(θ|d, a∗(d)): its marginal piD(d|a∗(d)) in d is proportional to the Defender’s
expected utility ψD(d, a
∗(d)) and, consequently, d∗GT = mode [piD(d | a∗(d))].
This leads to a solution approach for non-cooperative games that includes
the steps of sampling from the augmented distributions, marginalising to the
corresponding decision variables and estimating the mode of the marginal
sample.
It is generally impossible to sample directly from the augmented distribu-
tions. However, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, e.g. Gamer-
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man and Lopes (2006), serve for such purpose. They construct a Markov
chain in the space of the target distribution, the augmented distributions in
our case, guaranteed to converge in distribution to the target under mild con-
ditions. After convergence is detected, samples from the chain can be used
as approximate samples from the target. Various approaches are available
to construct the chains. For instance, C.1 discusses Gibbs based algorithms.
Here we adopt more versatile Metropolis-Hastings (MH) variants (Chib and
Greenberg 1995) as in Algorithm 2. This facilitates sampling approximately
from piD(d, θ | a∗(d)) (outer APS) to solve the Defender’s problem. Within
that, the Attacker’s best response a∗(d) is estimated for any given d using
another APS (inner APS) on piA(a, θ | d). Details of the acceptance/rejection
step follow. Let d and θ be the current samples in the MH scheme of the
outer APS. Within each iteration, a candidate d˜ for the Defender’s decision
is sampled from a proposal generating distribution gD(d˜ | d). We choose this
to be symmetric in the sense that it satisfies gD(d˜ | d) = gD(d | d˜). Then, the
Attacker’s problem is solved using an inner APS to estimate a∗(d˜). The state
θ is next sampled using pD(θ | d˜, a∗(d˜)). The candidate samples are accepted
with probability piD(d˜, θ˜ | a∗(d˜))/piD(d, θ | a∗(d)), which, after simplification,
adopts the form uD(d˜,θ˜)
uD(d,θ)
. Algorithm 2 thus defines a Markov chain in (d, θ)
such that (d(N), θ(N))
d−→ piD(d, θ |a∗(d)) where d−→ represents convergence in
distribution. Proposition 1 provides necessary conditions for the convergence
of its output to the decision d∗GT. Its proof is in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 If the Attacker’s and Defender’s utility functions are posi-
tive; pA(θ| d, a), pD(θ| d, a) > 0 ∀a, θ; uA(a, θ)pA(θ| d, a) and uD(d, θ)pD(θ| d, a)
are integrable; A, D, Θ are either discrete sets or intervals in Rn; and the pro-
posal generating distributions gA and gD are symmetric, Algorithm 2 defines
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function solve attacker(M , d, gA):
initialize: a(0)
Draw θ(0) ∼ pA(θ | d, a(0))
for i = 1 to M do . Inner APS
Propose new attack a˜ ∼ gA(a˜ | a(i−1)).
Draw θ˜ ∼ pA(θ | d, a˜)
Evaluate acceptance probability α = min
{
1, uA(a˜,θ˜)
uA(a(i−1),θ(i−1))
}
With probability α set a(i) = a˜, θ(i) = θ˜. Otherwise, set
a(i) = a(i−1), and θ(i) = θ(i−1).
Discard the first K samples and estimate mode of rest of draws
{a(i)}. Record it as a∗(d).
return a∗(d)
input: d, M , K, N , R, gD and gA symmetric proposal distributions
initialize: d(0), a∗(d(0)) = solve attacker(M , d(0), gA)
Draw θ(0) ∼ pD(θ | d(0), a∗(d(0)))
for i = 1 to N do . Outer APS
Propose new defense d˜ ∼ gD(d˜ | d(i−1))
a∗(d˜) = solve attacker(M , d˜, gA) if not previously computed
Draw θ˜ ∼ pD(θ | d˜, a∗(d˜)).
Evaluate acceptance probability α = min
{
1, uD(d˜,θ˜)
uD(d(i−1),θ(i−1))
}
With probability α set d(i) = d˜, a∗(d(i)) = a∗(d˜) and θ(i) = θ˜.
Otherwise, set d(i) = d(i−1), and θ(i) = θ(i−1).
Discard first R samples and estimate mode of rest of draws {d(i)}.
Record it as d̂∗GT.
Algorithm 2: MH APS for non-cooperative sequential games with
complete information.
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a Markov Chain with stationary distribution piD(d, θ |a∗(d)), and a consistent
mode estimator based on its marginal samples in d converges to d∗GT almost
surely.
In practice, as continuous candidate proposal generation gD and gA distri-
butions, this paper uses heavy tailed t distributions, centered at the current
solutions (Gamerman and Lopes 2006). When facing discrete or ordinal deci-
sions, we display those in a circular list and generate from neighbouring states
with equal probability. Practical convergence (for discarding the first K or R
samples) may be assessed with various statistics like Brooks-Gelman-Rubin’s
(BGR) (Brooks and Roberts 1998). Convergence of the Markov chain is at
a geometric rate as a function of the minimum and maximum utility values,
as described in D.1. Once the chain is judged to have converged, the initial
samples are discarded as burn-in and the remaining simulated values are used
as an approximate sample from the distribution of interest. In particular, the
marginal draws d(R+1), ..., d(N) would correspond to an approximate sample
from the marginal piD(d | a∗(d)). The sample mode must be estimated with
a consistent estimator in the sense of Romano (1988), see also the classical
work in Parzen (1962) and Grenander (1965).
Computationally, Algorithm 2 removes the loops over both D and A.
Thus, its complexity does not depend on the dimensions of those decision
spaces providing an intrinsic advantage over MC approaches in problems
with large or continuous spaces. In particular, Algorithm 2 requires N× (2×
M + 3) + 2M + 2 samples plus the cost of convergence checks and (at most)
N + 1 mode approximations.
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Example.
We demonstrate the framework with a simple cybersecurity problem. An
organization (Defender) has to choose among ten security protocols: d = 0
(no extra defensive action); d = i (level i protection protocol with increasing
protection), i = 1, . . . , 8; d = 9 (a safe but cumbersome protocol). The
Attacker has two alternatives: attack (a = 1) or not (a = 0). Successful
(unsuccessful) attacks are denoted with θ = 1 (θ = 0). Clearly, when there
is no attack, θ = 0.
θ
d 0 1
0 0.05 7.05
1 0.10 7.10
2 0.15 7.15
3 0.20 7.20
4 0.25 7.25
5 0.30 7.30
6 0.35 7.35
7 0.40 7.40
8 0.45 7.45
9 0.50 7.50
(a)
a
d 0 1
0 0.0 0.50
1 0.0 0.40
2 0.0 0.35
3 0.0 0.30
4 0.0 0.25
5 0.0 0.20
6 0.0 0.15
7 0.0 0.10
8 0.0 0.05
9 0.0 0.01
(b)
θ
a 0 1
0 0.00 0.00
1 -0.53 1.97
(c)
d αd βd
0 50.0 50.0
1 40.0 60.0
2 35.0 65.0
3 30.0 70.0
4 25.0 75.0
5 20.0 80.0
6 15.0 85.0
7 10.0 90.0
8 5.0 95.0
9 1.0 99.0
(d)
Table 1: (a) Def. net costs; (b) Successful attack probs.; (c) Att. net benefits;
(d) Beta dist. parameters
Defender non strategic judgments. Table 1a presents net costs cD as-
sociated with each decision and outcome, covering a 7Me business valuation,
and 0.05Me base security cost plus 0.05Me per each security level increase.
When the attack is successful, the defender loses the whole business value.
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The probability pD(θ = 1 | d, a) of successful attack given d and a is in
Table 1b (with complementary probabilities for unsuccessful attacks). The
Defender is constant risk averse in costs, with utility strategically equivalent
to uD(cD) = − exp (c× cD) with c = 0.4.
Attacker judgments. The average attack cost is estimated at 0.03Me.
The average benefit (due to market share captured, ransom, etc.) is 2Me.
An unsuccessful attack has an extra cost of 0.5M e. Table 1c presents
the Attacker’s net benefit cA associated with each attack and outcome. D
thinks that A is constant risk prone over benefits. His utility is strategically
equivalent to uA(cA) = exp (e× cA), with e > 0.
Start with the complete information case. To fix ideas, assume that
pA(θ = 1 | d, a) = pD(θ = 1 | d, a) (Table 1b) and e = 1. MC and APS
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Figure 2: Attacker problem solutions for each defense
approximate optimal decisions using Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively. First,
Figure 2a represents MC estimates of A’s expected utility for each d and
a. The optimal response a∗(d) for each d is the alternative with maximum
expected utility. For example, for d = 5, A’s optimal decision is to attack;
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for d = 8, he should not attack. Next, Figure 2b represents the frequencies of
marginal samples of a from the augmented distribution piA(a, θ |d) for each d.
Its mode coincides with the optimal attack decision. From d = 0 (no defense)
until 7, the Attacker should attack. With stronger defenses d = 8 and d = 9,
the mode is a = 0 and hence an attack is not advised. The Attacker’s best
responses a∗(d) for each defense d are thus identical with both approaches.
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(b) APS solution
Figure 3: Solutions of Defender problem
Armed with a∗(d), the optimal defense is computed again using MC and
APS. Figure 3a presents the MC estimation of ψD(d, a
∗(d)) for each d. Fig-
ure 3b shows sample frequencies from the marginal augmented distribution
piD(d | a∗(d)). Both methods agree that d∗GT is acquiring level 8 protection,
with level 9 a close competitor. It could be argued that finding the exact
optimal decision is not that crucial since the expected utilities for protection
levels 8 and 9 are very close. Moreover, as the expected utilities of d = 8
and d = 9 are very close, it is challenging to find the exact optimal decision.
APS could be helpful to check that, indeed, d = 8 is the optimal decision.
To do so, we could sample from a power augmented distribution, see Ap-
pendix D.2, more peaked around the mode, as in Appendix E.1. This also
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emphasizes another advantage of APS: despite eventual flatness of expected
utility, APS provides a method to find the optimal solution with little extra
computational cost. 4
2.3 Sensitivity analysis for games
The Defender’s judgments, expressed through (uD, pD), could be argued to
be well assessed, as she is the supported agent in the game. However, as
cogently argued in Keeney (2007), our knowledge about (uA, pA) may not be
that precise as it would require A to reveal his beliefs and preferences. This
is doubtful in domains such as cybersecurity and counter terrorism where
information is concealed and hidden to adversaries.
One could conduct a sensitivity analysis to mitigate this issue, consid-
ering that A’s preferences and beliefs are modeled through classes of utili-
ties u ∈ UA and probabilities p ∈ PA, summarizing the information avail-
able to D possibly obtained from leakage, earlier interactions or informants.
The stability of the proposed solution d∗GT could be assessed by compar-
ing Nash defenses d∗u,p computed for each pair (u, p). Several criteria have
been proposed to assess the stability of solutions in the areas of decision
making under uncertainty and sensitivity analysis (Insua 1990) and robust
Bayesian analysis (Insua and Ruggeri 2012). Of them, we shall use the re-
gret ru,p(d
∗
GT) = ψD(d
∗
GT, a
∗(d∗GT)) − ψD(d∗u,p, a∗(d∗u,p)), as it reflects the loss
in expected utility for the choice of the proposed d∗GT instead of d
∗
u,p that
should have been chosen for the actual judgements; (u, p) ∈ UA ×PA. Small
values of ru,p(d
∗
GT) would indicate robustness with respect to the Attacker’s
utility and probability: any pair (u, p) ∈ UA × PA could be chosen with no
significant changes in the attained expected utilities and d∗GT is thus robust.
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Otherwise, the relevance of the proposed Nash defense d∗GT should be criti-
cized and further investigated. Operationally, a threshold on the maximum
acceptable regret would be specified, as sketched in Algorithm 3.
input: d∗GT, UA, PA, R, threshold
for i = 1 to R do
Randomly sample u from UA and p from PA
Compute d∗u,p using Algorithm 2
Compute ru,p(d
∗
GT)
if ru,p(d
∗
GT) > threshold then
Robustness requirements not satisfied
Stop
Robustness requirements satisfied.
Algorithm 3: Robustness assessment of solutions for games with com-
plete information
Example (cont.)
We next check the robustness of d∗GT with respect to the utility and probabil-
ity assumptions. The optimal defense is computed for 10, 000 perturbations
of uA(cA) (sampling e
′ ∼ U(0, 2) and using u′A(cA) = exp (e′ × cA)) and the
probability pA(θ | d, a = 1) of successful attack in case A attacks for each
d (sampling from a Beta distribution with mean equal to the original value
and variance 0.1% of the corresponding mean for each d). Figure 4 reflects
the frequency with which each d is found optimal. The proposed d∗GT = 8
emerges 25% of the time as optimal. However, it is unstable as inducing
small perturbations in the utilities and probabilities leads to other solutions:
d = 9 appears 42% of the time as optimal and d = 7, 16%. More importantly,
large variations in optimal expected utilities are observed 33% of the time,
with maximum regret 42.5% of the total optimal expected utility: d∗GT = 8
16
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Figure 4: Sensitivity analysis of the solution of the game with complete
information
seems too sensitive to changes in uA and pA. 4
This will be addressed next by relaxing the complete information assumption.
3 Sequential non-cooperative games with in-
complete information: ARA
When the game theoretic solution lacks robustness or the complete informa-
tion assumption does not hold, the problem may be handled as a game with
incomplete information. The most common approach in such games is based
on the BNE concept. Alternatively, we use a decision analytic approach
based on ARA. Rios and Insua (2012) discuss the differences between both
concepts in simultaneous games showing that they may lead to different so-
lutions. An interesting feature of ARA is that it mitigates the common prior
assumption (Antos and Pfeffer 2010). We describe the relation between both
solution concepts in sequential games below.
ARA considers that the Defender actually has uncertainty about (uA, pA).
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Her problem is depicted in Figure 5a as an influence diagram, where A’s
action appears as an uncertainty. Her expected utility is ψD(d) =
∫
ψD(d, a)
pD(a|d) da which requires pD(a|d), her assessment of the probability that the
Attacker will choose a after having observed d. Then, her optimal decision is
d∗ARA = arg maxd∈D ψD(d). Our example will show a solution that does not
coincide with a Nash equilibrium.
ΘD A
UD
(a) Defender’s decision problem.
ΘD A
UA
(b) Defender analysis of Attacker prob-
lem.
Figure 5: Influence diagrams for Defender and Attacker problems.
Eliciting pD(a |d), which has a strategic component, is facilitated by ana-
lyzing A’s problem from D’s perspective, Figure 5b. For that, she would use
all information and judgment available about A’s utilities and probabilities.
However, instead of using point estimates for uA and pA to find A’s best re-
sponse a∗(d) given d as in Section 2, her uncertainty about the attacks would
derive from her uncertainty about (uA, pA) modelled through a distribution
F = (UA, PA) on the space of utilities and probabilities. Without loss of gen-
erality, assume that both UA and PA are defined over a common probability
space (Ω,A,P) with atomic elements ω ∈ Ω (Chung 2001). This induces
a distribution over the Attacker’s expected utility ψA(d, a), where the ran-
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dom expected utility for A would be ΨωA(d, a) =
∫
UωA(a, θ)P
ω
A(θ | d, a) dθ. In
turn, this induces a random optimal alternative defined through A∗(d)ω =
arg maxx∈AΨ
ω
A(d, x). Then, the Defender would find pD(a|d) = PF [A∗(d) = a]
= P(ω : A∗(d)ω = a) in the discrete case (and, similarly in the continuous
one). Observe that ω and P could be re-interpreted, respectively, as the type
and the common prior in Harsanyi’s doctrine. Then, P ωA and U
ω
A respectively
correspond to A’s probability and utility given his type, and (d∗, {A∗(d∗)ω})
would constitute a BNE. Thus, in the sequential Defend-Attack game, we can
operationally reinterpret the ARA approach in terms of Harsanyi’s, although
the underlying principles are different. Computationally, ARA models en-
tail integration and optimization procedures that can be challenging in many
cases. Therefore, we explore simulation based methods for ARA.
3.1 MC based approach for ARA
MC simulation approximates pD(a|d) for each d, drawing J samples {(uiA, piA)}Ji=1
from F and setting pˆD(a | d) = #{A∗(d)=a}J where A∗(d) = arg maxa
∫
uiA(a, θ)
piA(θ |d, a) dθ. This is then used as an input to the Defender’s expected utility
maximization, as reflected in Algorithm 4.
From a computational perspective, it requires generating |D|×[J× (|A|×
Q+ 2) +2P ] samples where Q and P are the number of samples required to
respectively approximate
∫
uiA(a, θ) p
i
A(θ | d, a) dθ and
∫ ∫
uD(d, θ)pD(θ | d, a)
pˆD(a | d) dθ da to the desired precision. Convergence follows from two ap-
plications of a uniform version of the SLLN as reflected in Appendix B.2.
In high dimensional cases, and when model uncertainty dominates, meth-
ods that automatically focus on high-probability-high impact events could
be faster and more robust. Hence, APS to solve ARA is investigated as a
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input: J , P , Q
for d ∈ D do
for i = 1 to J do
Sample uiA(a, θ) ∼ UωA(a, θ), piA(θ | d, a) ∼ P ωA(θ | d, a)
for a ∈ A do
Generate samples θ1, . . . , θQ ∼ piA(θ | d, a)
Approximate ψ̂iA(d, a) =
1
Q
∑
uiA(a, θi)
Find a∗i (d) = arg maxa ψ̂
i
A(d, a)
pˆD(a | d) = 1J
∑J
i=1 I[a
∗
i (d) = a]
for d ∈ D do
Generate samples (θ1, a1), . . . , (θP , aP ) ∼ pD(θ | d, a)pˆD(a | d)
Approximate ψ̂D(d) =
1
P
∑
uD(d, θi)
Compute d̂∗ARA = arg maxd ψ̂D(d)
Algorithm 4: MC based approach to solve the ARA problem
scalable alternative to MC.
3.2 APS for ARA
APS solves the ARA model by constructing augmented distributions for
the Attacker’s and Defender’s problems. To solve the Attacker’s decision
problem, this study constructs an APS in the state space of the Attacker’s
random utilities and probabilities. For a given d, this study builds the
random augmented distribution ΠωA(a, θ | d) ∝ UωA(a, θ)P ωA(θ | d, a), whose
marginal ΠωA(a | d) =
∫
ΠωA(a, θ | d) dθ is proportional to the random ex-
pected utility ΨωA(d, a). Then, the random optimal attack A
∗(d)ω coincides
almost surely with the mode of the marginal ΠωA(a | d) of this random aug-
mented distribution. Consequently, by sampling uA(a, θ) ∼ UA(a, θ) and
pA(θ | d, a) ∼ PA(θ | d, a), one can build piA(a, θ | d) ∝ uA(a, θ)pA(θ | d, a),
which is a sample from ΠA(a, θ | d). Then, mode(piA(a | d)) is a sample of
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A∗(d), whose distribution is PF [A∗(d) = a] = pD(a | d). Thus, this study
provides a mechanism to sample from pD(a | d).
Next, using backward induction, an augmented distribution for the De-
fender’s problem is introduced as piD(d, a, θ) ∝ uD(d, θ) pD(θ | d, a) pD(a | d).
Its marginal piD(d) =
∫ ∫
piD(d, a, θ) da dθ is proportional to the expected
utility ψD(d) and, consequently, d
∗
ARA = mode (piD(d)). Thus, one just needs
to sample (d, a, θ) ∼ piD(d, a, θ) and estimate its mode in d.
Algorithm 5 summarizes a nested MH based procedure for APS. Let d,
a and θ be the current state of the Markov Chain. This study samples
a candidate defense d˜ from a proposal generating distribution gD(d˜ | d), a
candidate a˜ from pA(a | d˜) using the Attacker’s APS as explained before,
and θ˜ ∼ pD(θ | d˜, a˜). These samples are accepted with probability α =
min
{
1, uD(d˜,θ˜)
uD(d,θ)
}
. The stationary distribution of this Markov Chain converges
to piD(d, a, θ) as reflected in Proposition 2, which provides conditions for the
convergence of the output of Algorithm 5 to the optimal decision d∗ARA. The
Appendix A contains the proof.
Proposition 2 If uD and almost all the utilities in the support of UA are
positive; pD(θ | d, a) and almost all distributions in the support of PA(θ | d, a)
are also positive; the products of utilities and probabilities are integrable; A,
D and Θ are either discrete or intervals in Rn; and the proposal generating
distributions gA and gD are symmetric, Algorithm 5 defines a Markov Chain
with stationary distribution piD(d, θ, a). Moreover, the mode of the marginal
samples of d from this Markov chain approximates the solution d∗ARA.
Computationally, Algorithm 5 requires generating N × (2M + 5) + 2M + 4
samples from multivariate distributions in addition to the cost of the con-
vergence checks and mode computations. Again, this algorithm removes the
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function sample attack(d, M , K, gA, UA, PA):
initialize: a(0)
Draw uA(a, θ) ∼ UωA(a, θ)
Draw pA(θ | a, d) ∼ P ωA(θ | d, a)
Draw θ(0) ∼ pA(θ | a(0), d)
for i = 1 to M do . Inner APS
Propose new attack a˜ ∼ gA(a˜ | a(i−1))
Draw θ˜ ∼ pA(θ | d, a˜)
Evaluate acceptance probability α = min
{
1,
uA(a˜,θ˜)
uA(a(i−1),θ(i−1))
}
With probability α set a(i) = a˜, θ(i) = θ˜. Otherwise, set
a(i) = a(i−1) and θ(i) = θ(i−1).
If convergence, discard first K samples and compute mode a∗(d) of
rest of draws {a(i)}
return a∗(d)
input: d, UA, PA, M , K, N , R, gD and gA symmetric distributions
initialize: d(0) = d
Draw a(0) ∼ pA(a | d(0)) using sample attack(d(0), M , K, gA, UA, PA)
Draw θ(0) ∼ pD(θ | d(0), a(0))
for i = 1 to N do . Outer APS
Propose new defense d˜ ∼ gD(d˜ | d(i−1))
Draw a˜ ∼ pA(a | d˜) using sample attack(d˜, M , K, gA, UA, PA)
Draw θ˜ ∼ pD(θ | d˜, a˜)
Evaluate acceptance probability α = min
{
1,
uD(d˜,θ˜)
uD(d(i−1),θ(i−1))
}
With probability α set d(i) = d˜, a(i) = a˜ and θ(i) = θ˜. Otherwise,
set d(i) = d(i−1), a(i) = a(i−1) and θ(i) = θ(i−1).
If convergence, discard first R samples and compute mode d̂∗ARA of rest
of draws {d(i)}
Algorithm 5: MH APS to approximate ARA solution in the sequential
game.
22
need for loops over A and D. This would be an excellent choice when facing
a problem where the cardinality of these spaces is large or the decisions are
continuous. Note though that, in the discrete case, an alternative could be
to combine MC and APS. If the cardinality of the D is low, it could be more
convenient to estimate the value of pD(a | d) for each d, drawing J samples
a ∼ pD(a | d) and counting frequencies as in Section 3.1. Then, in the De-
fender’s APS, instead of invoking the attacker’s one each time we need a
sample a ∼ pD(a | d), we would directly sample from the estimate pˆD(a | d).
Finally, Appendix C.2 provides a Gibbs based algorithm.
Example (Cont.)
Complete information is no longer available. D’s beliefs over A’s judgements
are described through PA and UA. Assume A’s random probability of success
is modeled as PA(θ = 1 | d, a = 1) ∼ Beta(αd, βd) with parameters αd and βd
in Table 1d (their expected values are equal to pD(θ = 1 | d, a) from Table
1b). In addition, A’s risk coefficient e is uncertain, with e ∼ U(0, 2), inducing
the random utility UA(cA).
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Figure 6: Estimation of pD(a | d) through ARA
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Figure 7: ARA solutions for the Defender
In this case, for APS, as the cardinality of D is small, one can estimate
the value of pD(a | d) for each d. Figure 6 presents the estimates pˆD(a | d),
obtained using MC and APS. They coincide up to numerical errors. Next,
the ARA solution for the Defender is computed. Figure 7a shows the MC es-
timation of the Defender’s expected utility; Figure 7b presents the frequency
of samples from the marginal piD(d). Its mode coincides with the optimal
defense, d∗ARA = 9, in agreement with the MC solution. The ARA decision
does not correspond to the Nash equilibrium d∗GT since its informational as-
sumptions are different. In this case, it appears to be more conservative, as
it suggests a safer but more expensive defense. In Appendix E.2, we repeat
the experiment dividing the αd and βd values by 100 in Table 1d, thus induc-
ing more uncertainty about the attacker’s probabilities. The ARA solution
(d∗ARA = 9) remains stable despite these changes. 4
3.3 Sensitivity analysis of the ARA solution
The ARA approach leads to a decision analysis problem with the peculiarity
of including a sampling procedure to forecast A’s actions. A sensitivity analy-
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sis should be conducted with respect to its inputs (uD(d, θ), pD(θ|d, a), pD(a|d)).
However, focus should be on pD(a | d), the most contentious element as it
comes from adversarial calculations based on the random utility UA(a, θ) and
probability distribution PA(θ | d, a). We would proceed similarly to Section
2.3 evaluating the impact of the imprecision on U and P over the attained
expected utility ψ(d∗UPARA) using classes UA, PA of random utilities and prob-
abilities, and for each pair (U, P ) from such classes, pUPD (a | d) would be
obtained to compute d∗UPARA, estimating then the maximum regret.
4 Computational assessment
This section discusses computational complexity results of the proposed al-
gorithms.
4.1 Computational complexity
Table 2 summarizes the computational complexity of MC and APS for solv-
ing games with complete and incomplete information compiled from earlier
sections. Recall that parameters P , Q, N and M would typically depend on
the desired precision, as outlined in EC.1.1.
MC APS
Complete |D| × (|A| ×Q+ P ) N × (2M + 3) + 2M + 2
Incomplete |D| × [J × (|A| ×Q+ 2) + 2P ] N × (2M + 5) + 2M + 4
Table 2: Required sample sizes by MC and APS algorithms for games with
complete and incomplete information
With continuous decision variables, the decision space is discretized to
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approximate the MC solution, as will be done in Section 4.2. This discretiza-
tion step impacts the precision of the solution and the cardinalities of D and
A which, in turn, affect complexity. The main lesson from Table 2 is that
the number of MC samples depends on the cardinality of the Defender’s and
Attacker’s decision spaces, whereas this dependence is not present in APS.
Thus, this approach would be expected to be more efficient than MC for
problems with large decision spaces as is illustrated next.
4.2 A computational comparison
A simple game with continuous decision spaces is used to compare the scal-
ability of both methods. Each agent makes a decision d, a ∈ [0, 1] about the
proportion of resources respectively invested to defend and attack a server
with value s. Let θ designate the proportion of losses for the defender under
a successful attack. It is modeled with a Beta distribution with parameters
α(d, a) and β(d, a), with α (β) increasing in a (d) and decreasing in d (a).
D’s payoff function is f(d, θ) = (1− θ)× s− c× d, where c denotes her unit
resource cost. She is constant risk averse with utility strategically equiva-
lent to 1 − exp (−h× f(d, θ)), h > 0. A’s payoff is g(a, θ) = θ × s − e × a,
where e denotes A’s unit resource cost. He is constant risk prone with utility
strategically equivalent to exp (−k × g(a, θ)), k > 0.
Figure 8 provides the MC estimates of D’s expected utility, which is ar-
guably flat. To increase efficiency of the APS algorithm in finding the mode,
we replace the marginal augmented distribution piD(d | a∗(d)) by its power
transformation piHD (d |a∗(d)), where H is defined as the augmentation param-
eter, to make the distribution more peaked around the mode (Mu¨ller 2005),
see Aktekin and Ekin (2016) and Ekin (2018) for applications. As we shall
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see, this provides another advantage of APS over MC, by improving the ef-
ficiency of direct MC sampling from flat regions. EC.3.2 present details and
sketches a convergence proof for this approach. Sampling from piHD (d | a∗(d))
can be easily done using Algorithm 2 but drawing H copies of θ˜ instead of
just one (Mu¨ller et al. 2004). The acceptance probability for D’s problem at
a given iteration i, would be now min
{
1,
∏H
t=1
uD(d˜,θ˜t)
uD(d(i−1),θ
(i−1)
t )
}
, as shown in
Appendix D.2. A’s problem includes a similar augmentation. The augmen-
tation parameters for A and D are referred to as inner and outer powers,
respectively.
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Figure 8: Defender’s expected utility surface
We therefore investigate the trade-off between precision and required sam-
ple size finding a limit precision such that MC (APS) is faster for smaller
(bigger) precision. The minimum number of required MC and APS samples
for optimality and the time to achieve an optimal decision with a given pre-
cision are computed for both A and D problems, respectively designated as
inner and outer samples. APS also includes choosing the minimum inner
and outer powers for which chains are judged to have converged. For a fair
comparison, this study conducts several parallel replications of MC and APS
with an increasing number of samples until 90% of the solutions coincide
27
with the optimal decision (computed with MC for a large number of sam-
ples) and the algorithm is declared to have reached the desired precision for
such number of iterations.
Samples Power
Precision Algorithm Outer Inner Outer Inner Time (s)
0.1 MC 1000 100 - - 0.007
APS 60 100 900 20 0.240
0.01 MC 717000 100 - - 13.479
APS 300 100 6000 100 2.461
Table 3: Computational time, minimum number of required MC and APS
samples and augmentation parameters at optimality for different precisions
Table 3 presents MC and APS performance, in terms of computational
times, for precisions 0.1 and 0.01, computed using a server node with 16 cores
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2640 v3 @ 2.60GHz. For instance, with precision
0.1, we discretise D through d = {0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1} ∈ D, and the cardinality
of the decision spaces is small, |D| = |A| = 11. Computational runs show
the need for only 1, 000 and 100 MC samples to reach optimality with the
required precision to solve D and A problems, respectively: MC outperforms
APS. However, the performance of MC diminishes for higher precision. For
instance, for 0.01, |D| = |A| = 101 and MC becomes more demanding: APS
outperforms MC, as we get rid of the dependence on |D| and |A|. Indeed, for
MC, there is a factor of 200 between the time needed to obtain the solutions
with precision 0.01 and 0.1. For APS, this factor is just 10, suggesting that
it scales much better with precision. For smaller precision, such as 0.001, we
could not even get a stable solution using MC even with a large number of
samples (P = 10M, Q = 100k). Finally, observe that as the expected utility
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is flat around the optimal decision, see Figure 8, MC requires a higher number
of samples to converge to the optimal solution than the peaked version of
APS. To sum up, in problems with large or continuous decision spaces and/or
flat expected utilities, APS would be preferred over MC for its scalability.
5 A cybersecurity application
We illustrate the proposed framework by solving a real cybersecurity prob-
lem. Figure 9 presents the influence diagram, which simplifies the case study
in Rios Insua et al. (2019) by retaining only the adversarial cyber threat.
An organisation (Defender) faces a competitor (Attacker) that may attempt
a DDoS to undermine the Defender site’s availability and compromise her
customer services.
Security controls
s
Security
controls cost
cs|s
Competitor
attack
a|s
Duration DDoS
p(l|a, s)
Detection of
attacker
p(t|a)
Impact on
market share
p(m|l)
Costs when
detected
p(ct|t)
Attacker
earnings
e|m
Result of
the attack
ca
Total costs
cd
Defender
utility u(cd)
Attacker
utility uA(ca)
Figure 9: Bi-agent influence diagram of the cybersecurity application.
The Defender has to determine which security controls to implement: she
29
has to decide about the level of subscription to a monthly cloud-based DDoS
protection system, with choices including 0 (not subscribing), 5, 10, 15, . . . , 190,
and 195 gbps. The Attacker must decide on the intensity of his DDoS attack,
viewed as the number of days (from 0 to 30) that he will attempt to launch
it. The duration of the DDoS may impact the Defender’s market share, due
to reputational loss. The Attacker gains all market share lost by D, which
determines his earnings. However, he runs the risk of being detected with
significant costs. Both agents aim at maximizing expected utility. Details on
the required models at various nodes are presented in Appendix F, further
explanations can be found at Rios Insua et al. (2019) and our GitHub site
(Torres-Barra´n and Naveiro 2019).
This is a problem with incomplete information and large decision spaces.
We compute the ARA solution using APS. First, we estimate the probabilities
pD(a | d) for each defense d. As in Section 4.2, we replace A’s marginal
augmented distribution piA by its power transformation pi
H
A to increase APS
efficiency in finding the mode. In addition, as in simulated annealing, within
each APS iteration we increase H using an appropriate cooling schedule
(Mu¨ller et al. 2004), see Appendix D.2 for details. Figure 10a displays pD(a|d)
for four possible defenses (0, 5, 10, 15). When no defensive action is adopted
(d = 0), D is convinced that A will launch the worst DDoS attack (30
days). Subscribing to a low protection plan (d = 5) makes little practical
difference. However, when increasing the protection to 10 gbps, the attack
forecast (from D’s perspective) becomes a mixture of high and low intensity
values. The reason for this is that, when d = 10, small perturbations in the
Defender’s assumptions about the Attacker’s elements, induce big changes in
the optimal attack. Finally, a 15 gbps protection convinces D that she will
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avoid the attack, attaining a deterrence effect. The optimal solution remains
the same for d > 15, and therefore results are not displayed.
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Figure 10: ARA solution computed using APS
Figure 10b shows a histogram of the APS samples for the D’s decision.
As expected, the frequency of samples with value 15 is similar to the ones
with higher values. As the histogram, and consequently the expected utility
surface, is very flat, we cannot resolve the mode. Thus, as we did in A’s
problem, we sample from increasing H powers of D’s marginal augmented
distribution. As illustrated in Figure 11, increasing H makes the distribution
more peaked around the optimal decision d∗ARA = 15, the cheapest plan that
avoids the attack from D’s perspective.
One can argue that finding the exact optimal decision may not be that
crucial since the expected utilities for different protections are close. That is
a valid point. However, the flat expected optimal utility region might be too
big. By sampling from a power transformation of the marginal augmented
distribution, APS permits finding the optimal solution even when facing such
flat expected utilities at little extra computational cost. Moreover, we can
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emphasize another advantage of APS: it provides the distribution piD(d|a∗(d))
as part of the solution, providing sensitivity analysis at no extra cost. The
decision maker may want to take such sensitivity of the optimal decision
into account, and could consider a defense which could be practically more
robust.
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Figure 11: APS solutions for different augmentation parameter values
6 Discussion
We have considered the problem of supporting a decision maker against ad-
versaries in an environment with random consequences depending on the
actions of all participants. The proposed procedure is summarized as fol-
lows. Under complete information, we compute the game-theoretic solution
and conduct a sensitivity analysis. If stable, such solution may be used
with confidence and no further analysis is required. Otherwise, or if com-
plete information is lacking, we relax the above assumption and use ARA
as an alternative decision analytic approach. If the ARA solution is stable,
one may use it with confidence and stop the analysis. Otherwise, one must
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gather more data and refine relevant probability and utility classes, eventu-
ally declaring the robustness of the ARA solution. If not sufficient, one could
undertake a minimum regret (or other robust) analysis.
We have provided MC and APS methods to solve for these games. With
large decision spaces, APS would be more efficient as its complexity does not
depend on decision sets’ cardinality. It should be also noted that MC errors
associated with approximating the expected utility could overwhelm the cal-
culation of the optimal decision. Samples from p(θ | d, a) will typically need
to be recomputed for each pair (d, a). In contrast, APS performs the expec-
tation and optimization simultaneously, sampling d from regions with high
utility with draws of θ from the utility-tilted augmented distribution. This
reduces MC error as optimization effort in parts of the parameter space with
low utility values is limited, resulting in reduced sample sizes for the same
precision. In problems with continuous decision sets, an extension of the pro-
posed approaches could use MC to limit the area of the decision space where
the optimum is located, and then switching to APS to search within that
area in more detail. Exploiting gradient information of the utility functions
(Naveiro and Insua 2019) could also be useful. Apart from computational is-
sues, when the expected utility surface is flat, MC simulation may need many
draws or result in poor estimates, being also inefficient for random variables
with skewed distributions. APS could handle those cases better as it is based
on sampling from the optimizing portions of the decision space. Moreover,
APS could sample from a power transformation of the marginal augmented
distribution, which is less flat and more peaked around the mode. Finally,
in addition to sequential two stage games, these ideas could be extended to
other game types such as simultaneous defend-attack games (Rios and Insua
33
2012) and general bi-agent influence diagrams (Gonza´lez-Ortega et al. 2019).
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A Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1: Under the hypothesis, for each d, piA(a, θ | d) is a well-defined
distribution and the samples generated within the inner APS loop in Algo-
rithm 2 define a Markov chain with piA(a, θ | d) as stationary distribution
(Gamerman and Lopes 2006). Once convergence is detected (at iteration
K), the remaining M − K marginal samples a(i) of the Markov chain are
approximate samples from piA(a | d). For large enough M −K, a consistent
sample mode estimator (in the sense of Romano (1988)) converges almost
surely to a∗(d). Similarly, under the hypothesis, piD(d, θ | a∗(d)) is a well-
defined distribution and the samples generated in the outer APS loop in Al-
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gorithm 2 define a Markov chain with stationary distribution piD(d, θ |a∗(d)).
Once MCMC convergence is detected (at iteration R), the remaining N −R
marginal samples d(i) of the Markov chain are approximate samples from
piD(d | a∗(d)). Hence, their sample mode estimator converges to d∗GT almost
surely (Romano 1988).
Proposition 2: Given our hypothesis about UωA(a, θ) and P
ω
A(θ | d, a) for
each d, the distributions piA(a, θ | d) ∼ ΠωA(a, θ | d) given by piA(a, θ | d) ∝
uA(a, θ)pA(θ | a, d) with uA ∼ UωA and pA ∼ P ωA , are well defined a.s. More-
over, the samples a generated through sample attack in Algorithm 5 are
distributed according to PF [A∗(d) = a] = pD(a | d). Indeed, as we are sam-
pling uA(a, θ) ∼ UωA(a, θ) and pA(θ | d, a) ∼ P ωA(θ | d, a); piA(a, θ | d) ∝
uA(a, θ)pA(θ | d, a), is a sample from ΠωA(a, θ | d). Then, mode(piA(a | d))
is a sample from A∗(d)ω, whose distribution is PF [A∗(d) = a]. To compute
this mode, we sample a, θ ∼ piA(a, θ | d) using MH, defining a Markov chain
{a(i), θ(i); i = 1, ...,M} (loop in function sample attack) whose stationary
distribution is piA(a, θ | d), (Roberts and Smith 1994). Once MCMC conver-
gence is assessed, the first K samples of a are discarded as burn-in samples
and the remaining M −K marginal samples are approximate samples from
piA(a | d). For large enough M − K, the mode of such marginal samples
approximates the mode of piA(a, θ | d), based on a consistent mode estimator
(Romano 1988).
Next, as uD is positive and uD(d, θ)pD(θ|d, a)pD(a|d) integrable, piD(d, a, θ)
is well-defined and is the stationary distribution of the Markov chain defined
by the outer APS in Algorithm 5. Once MCMC convergence is detected,
the first R samples of d are discarded as burn-in and the remaining N − R
samples are approximately distributed as piD(d). Hence, a consistent mode
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estimation of these samples approximates d∗ARA.
B Proofs of Monte Carlo based approaches
We briefly present convergence of MC approximations in Algorithms 1 and
4.
B.1 Algorithm 1. Subgame perfect equilibria
Suppose that A is a compact set in an Euclidean space; Θ is an Euclidean
space; uA(a, θ) is continuous in a for each θ and measurable in θ for each a;
there exists a function h(θ), integrable with respect to pA(θ|d, a), such that
|uA(a, θ)| ≤ h(θ). Then, for almost all sequences {θi} forming a sample from
pA(θ | d, a), ψ̂A(d, a) = 1Q
∑Q
i=1 uA(a, θi)→ ψA(d, a) when Q→∞ uniformly
in a, as in Thm.2 in Jennrich (1969). Then, assuming that the best response
a∗(d) is unique, we can prove that arg maxa ψ̂A(d, a) converges almost surely
to a∗(d) as Q→∞, with arguments similar to Thm.1 in Shao (1989).
Next, under similar conditions for uD(d, θ), pD(θ|d, a) and D, we have
the almost sure uniform convergence of the Monte Carlo averages ψ̂D(d) =
1
P
∑P
i=1 uD(d, θi) to the expected utilities ψD(d) as P → ∞ and, therefore,
the almost sure convergence of arg maxd ψ̂D(d) to d
∗
GT.
Several relevant comments are:
• When A and D are finite, the same argument applies.
• When a∗(d) is not unique, corresponding to a case of alternative optima,
convergence to the optima may not hold (although it would hold for the
maximal expected utilities), but we may disentangle several convergent
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subsequences to alternative best responses in case the set of alternative
optima is finite. Then, the argument would hold for the inner loop.
And similarly, for the outer loop. Note that with an infinite set of
alternative optima we could have extreme cases, although we would
estimate correctly the optimal expected utilities.
• The uniform convergence condition facilitates the use of regression
metamodels (Chen et al. 2013) allowing to replace expected utilities
in just a few values of a or d and then optimizing the metamodel as an
alternative computational approach.
• Recall that P and Q are essentially dictated by the required precision.
Based on the Central Limit Theorem (Chung 2001), MC sums approx-
imate integrals with probabilistic bounds of the order
√
var
N
where N
is the MC sum size. To obtain a variance estimate, we run a few itera-
tions and estimate the variance, then choosing the required size based
on such bounds. In our case, in which there are multiple integrals to
approximate associated to the various a and/or d, we would run a few
MC iterations at several a or d values and use the maximum variance
to estimate the required MC simulation sizes Q and P .
B.2 Algorithm 4. ARA solutions
Convergence follows a similar path to B.1. Suppose that, almost surely,
UωA(a, θ) is continuous in a for each θ and measurable in θ; there is h(θ)
integrable such that for each a and |UωA(a, θ)| ≤ h(θ); and A is compact.
Then, with the same argument arg maxa Ψ̂
ω
A(a, d) converges almost surely to
A∗(d)ω. Next, by construction pD(a | d) = P (A∗(d) = a). Using the SLLN
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pˆD(a | d) converges almost surely to pD(a | d). The rest of the approximation
follows by another application of a uniform version of the SLLN.
C Gibbs sampling based APS methods
Our core algorithms, Algorithms 2 and 5 are of the MH type. This section
covers Gibbs sampler based APS versions. Gibbs sampling (GS) (Roberts
and Smith 1994) can be utilized in cases where samples from full conditional
distributions are available. This typically requires a more substantial prelim-
inary analysis than MH, but tends to converge faster (when full conditionals
are available). They iteratively sample from the conditional distributions
resulting in samples from the joint distribution in the limit under mild con-
ditions (Casella and George 1992).
C.1 Subgame perfect equilibria
Based on the analysis in Section 2.2, Algorithm 6 summarizes a GS proce-
dure. For each d, the Attacker’s APS samples iteratively from piA(a |θ, d) and
piA(θ|d, a), whereas the Defender’s APS samples iteratively from piD(d|θ, a∗(d))
and piD(θ | d, a∗(d)). Convergence of Algorithm 6 follows from arguments
similar to Proposition 1. It requires 2× (|D|×M +N) samples plus the cost
of convergence checks and |D|+ 1 mode approximations. The computational
complexity of Algorithm 6 does not depend on the dimension of A, which
could be crucial when |A| is very large or A is continuous.
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input: N , M , K
initialize: a(0), θ(0)
for d ∈ D do
for j = 1 to M do
Draw θ
(j)
A from piA(θ | d, a(j−1))
Draw a(j) from piA(a | θ(j)A , d)
Compute mode of M draws {a(j)} and record it as a∗(d)
initialize: d(0), θ(0)
for i = 1 to N do
Draw θ
(i)
D from piD(θ | d(i−1), a∗(d(i−1)))
Draw d(i) from piD(d | θ(i)D , a∗(d))
Discard first K samples, compute mode of rest of draws {d(i)} and
propose it as d̂∗GT
Algorithm 6: Gibbs based APS to solve a game with complete infor-
mation.
C.2 ARA for incomplete information games
Similarly, we consider a Gibbs sampler based APS approach for the ARA
model in incomplete information games as an alternative to Algorithm 5.
The convergence of the Algorithm 7 follows similarly as from Proposition 2.
D Further convergence results
We present results referring to the convergence rate of the MCMC algorithms
and the convergence of APS with several copies to peak the mode.
43
input: N,M, J
for d ∈ D do
for j = 1 to J do
Sample U jA, P
j
A and define Π
j
A
Initialize θ0
for i = 1 to M do
Sample a(i) from ΠjA(a | θ(i−1), d)
Sample θ(i) from ΠjA(θ | a(i), d)
Estimate a∗j as mode of {a(i)}
Estimate pD(a | d) from {a∗j}
Initialize (d(0), θ(0))
for i = 1 to N do
Draw d(i) from piD(d | a(i−1), θ(i−1)D )
Draw θ
(i)
D from piD(θ | a(i−1), d(i))
Draw a(i) from piD(a | d(i), θ(i)D )
Estimate d∗ as mode of {d(i)}, record it as d∗ARA.
Algorithm 7: Gibbs based APS approach to solve the ARA problem
D.1 Convergence rate of MCMC for games with com-
plete information
The geometric convergence rate of MCMC algorithms is widely studied in
the Bayesian computation literature including Roberts and Polson (1994),
Roberts and Tweedie (1996) and Mengersen and Tweedie (1996).
In our setup, for games with complete information, we define a discrete
Markov chain in (d, θ) with target stationary distribution piD(d, θ |a∗(d)). For
the following discussion, assume (d, θ) to be finite. The transition probabil-
ities are defined Pij(n) = P (dn+1 = d
′, θn+1 = θ′ | dn = d, θn = θ), on the
space (d,θ) for i = (d, θ) and j = (d′, θ′) with stationary distribution pi∗(d, θ).
Suppose there exists a constant 0 < a < ∞ such that the proposal density
satisfies p(d′ |d) > a so that the chain is irreducible. This allows us to obtain
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a bound on the transition kernel of the Markov chain related to the ergodic-
ity coefficient τ [P (n)] = 1 − infi,j
∑m
l=1 inf(Pil(n), Pjl(n)). The convergence
rate of the samples from a Markov chain to the limiting distribution (target
density) is characterized by δ[P (n)] = 1 − τ [P (n)], referred to as the delta
coefficient of P (n) (Isaacson and Madsen 1976).
For a constant b such that 0 6 b < ∞, bounds are established, Pij(n) >
a exp{−b}, that results in geometric convergence with a rate characterized
by δ[P (n)]. Assuming a bounded Defender utility function such that u0 6
uD(d, θ) 6 u1, and setting b = log(u1/u0) where  is an infinitesimal value;
we have Pij(n) > a(u0/u1) = a exp{−b}, which results in an irreducible and
aperiodic Markov chain.
Overall, MCMC sampling can result in fast convergence such as geometric
convergence in many cases and polynomial time in some cases in contrast to
standard central limit theorem type convergence of MC estimation, as also
detailed in Jacquier et al. (2007).
D.2 Sampling from a power transformation of the marginal
augmented distribution
One possibility to increase efficiency of APS in finding the mode (especially
for the case of flat expected utility surfaces) is to sample from a power trans-
formation of the marginal augmented distribution rather than sampling from
the original distribution. Next, we provide a demonstration of such sampling
and its convergence guarantees. For the sake of illustration, we just deal with
the Attacker’s problem for a given defense d.
Assume we are interested in maximizing the Attacker’s expected utility for
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a given defense d, ψA(a, θ) =
∫
uA(a, θ)pA(θ|d, a) dθ. We define an augmented
distribution piH(a, ·) such that its marginal distribution in a is proportional to
ψHA (a, θ), with H ≥ 1 defined as the augmentation parameter. Now, ψHA (a, θ)
is more peaked around the optimal attack and, consequently the marginal
on a of piH(a, ·) will be more peaked around such mode, thus facilitating its
identification. Let us define this augmented distribution creating H identical
copies of the state θ and using piH(a, θ1, . . . , θH |d) ∝
∏H
i=1 uA(a, θi)pA(θi|d, a).
Its marginal in a is piH(a|d) ∝
[∫
uA(a, θ)pA(θ|d, a) dθ
]H
= ψHA (a, θ) as re-
quested. Samples from this marginal will cluster tightly around the mode
as H increases, since this distribution will be more peaked. To get those
samples, for a given value of H, we sample from piH(a, θ1, . . . , θH |d) and just
keep the samples of a, using the following MH scheme: suppose the current
state of the Markov chain is (a, θ1, . . . , θH); generate a candidate a˜ from a
symmetric proposal gA(·|a), and propose θ˜i ∼ pA(θ|d, a˜) for i = 1, . . . , H;
accept a˜, θ˜1, . . . , θ˜H with probability
min
{
1,
H∏
i=1
uA(a˜, θ˜i)
uA(a, θi)
}
, (1)
otherwise, maintain the current (a, θ1, . . . , θH). This defines a Markov chain
with stationary distribution piH(a, θ1, . . . , θH |d) (Tierney 1994). Indeed, the
acceptance probability of a Metropolis-Hastings scheme for a target distribu-
tion piH(a, θ1, . . . , θH |d) with proposal distribution q(a˜, θ˜1, . . . , θ˜H |a, θ1, . . . , θH) =
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gA(a˜|a)
∏H
i=1 pA(θ˜i|d, a˜) is
min
{
1,
piH(a˜, θ˜1, . . . , θ˜H)|d
piH(a, θ1, . . . , θH |d) ·
q(a, θ1, . . . , θH |a˜, θ˜1, . . . , θ˜H)
q(a˜, θ˜1, . . . , θ˜H |a, θ1, . . . , θH)
}
= min
{
1,
∏H
i=1 uA(a˜, θ˜i)pA(θ˜i|d, a˜)∏H
i=1 uA(a, θi)pA(θi|d, a)
· gA(a|a˜)
∏H
i=1 pA(θi|d, a)
gA(a˜|a)
∏H
i=1 pA(θ˜i|d, a˜)
}
= min
{
1,
H∏
i=1
uA(a˜, θ˜i)
uA(a, θi)
}
.
Thus, samples from piH(a, θ1, . . . , θH |d) can be generated running this MH
scheme for a certain number of iterations, and discarding the initial ones as
burn-in samples.
Direct application of this approach might not be feasible when the de-
cision sets are high dimensional, as mode identification becomes more chal-
lenging. Mu¨ller et al. (2004) offer a solution for this issue that consists of
embedding the previous MH scheme within an annealing schedule. Thus,
within each APS iteration we increase H using an appropriate cooling sched-
ule. This produces an inhomogeneous Markov chain that converges to the
mode of piH(a|d) (the optimal attack). A proof could be found in Mu¨ller
et al. (2004).
E Illustrative examples
We provide further insights about our illustrative examples that are presented
in Sections 2.2 and 3.2.
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E.1 Checking the optimal solution
As can be seen in Figure 3 from Section 2.2, while d = 8 is declared optimal,
the expected utilities of decisions 8 and 9 are very close. APS is useful in
checking that, indeed, d∗GT = 8. Something similar happens with the ARA
solution in Figure 7.
We repeat both experiments using APS but, as in Section 5, replacing the
defender’s marginal augmented distribution piD by its power transformation
piHD , which is more peaked around the mode. In addition, as in simulated
annealing, within each APS iteration we increase H using an appropriate
cooling schedule (Mu¨ller et al. 2004). Figure 12 displays the results show-
ing that, indeed, the game-theoretic solution under complete information is
d∗GT = 8, while ARA would recommend d
∗
ARA = 9.
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Figure 12: Defender optimal solutions for the game with complete informa-
tion (a) and ARA (b)
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E.2 ARA robustness
We repeat the experiment in Section 3.2 to test the robustness of the ARA
solution with respect to our uncertainty level about the attacker. The random
probability of success for the Attacker is modeled again as PA(θ = 1 | d, a =
1) ∼ Beta(αd, βd) but, instead of using parameter values of αd and βd from
Table 1d, we divide both by 100. That way, the variances of the resulting
beta distributions are more than 50 times larger. The resulting pD(a | d),
obtained with MC and APS, is shown in Figures 13a and 13b, respectively.
As expected, these pD(a | d) distributions are more spread than those in
Section 3.2, reflecting the fact that the Defender is more uncertain about
the Attacker’s behaviour. However, the optimal ARA solution (d∗ARA = 9)
remains stable, as can be seen in Figures 14a and 14b.
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(b) APS estimation of pD(a | d)
Figure 13: Estimation of pD(a | d) through ARA
F Details of cybersecurity case study
We provide the comprehensive details of the cybersecurity case study in
Section 5, structuring the information according to the nodes in the BAID
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Figure 14: ARA solutions for the Defender
in Figure 9.
Security controls:
The Defender has to determine the security controls, the protection level of
a cloud-based DDoS protection system, with choices including 0 (not sub-
scribing), 5, 10, 15, . . . , 190, and 195 gbps.
Security controls cost:
Subscription costs cs are presented in Figure 15.
Competitor attack:
The Attacker must decide about the number of days that he will attempt to
launch a DDoS attack, his possible alternatives being {0, 1, . . . , 30}.
Duration DDoS:
The duration l in hours of all DDoS attacks depends on both d, the cloud-
based protection hired by the organization, and the number of attacking
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Figure 15: Costs of DDoS protection given protection hired
attempts, a. We model the length lj of the j-th individual attack as a Γ(4, 1)
distribution (its average duration is 4 hours). This duration is conditional
on whether the attack actually saturates the target, which depends on the
capacity of the attacker’s DDoS platform minus the absorption of the cloud-
based system. We assume that the Attacker uses a professional platform
capable of producing attacks of 5 gbps, modelled through a Γ(5, 1) distribu-
tion. We then subtract the traffic d absorbed by the protection system to
determine whether the attack was successful which happens when its traffic
overflows the protection system. Thus, the total duration is l =
∑a
j=1 lj,
with lj ∼ Γ(4, 1) when Γ(5, 1)− d > 0 and lj = 0, otherwise.
To model the Attacker random beliefs about the duration of the attack,
we base our estimate on that of the Defender. We model the length of the j-th
individual DDoS attack as a random gamma distribution Γlength(υ, υ/µ) with
υ ∼ U(3.6, 4.8) and υ/µ ∼ U(0.8, 1.2) so that we add uncertainty about the
average duration (between 3 and 6 hours) and the dispersion. Similarly, we
model the attack gbps through a random gamma distribution Γgbps(ω, ω/η)
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with ω ∼ U(4.8, 5.6) and ω/η ∼ U(0.8, 1.2). Next, we subtract the protection
d from Γgbps to determine whether the DDoS is successful. We then use
l =
∑a
j lj, with lj ∼ Γlength if Γgbps − d > 0, and lj = 0 otherwise.
Impact on market share:
The DDoS duration might cause a reputational loss that would affect the or-
ganisation market share. The current market share is 50% valued at 1,500,000
e. We assume that all market share is fully lost at a linear rate until lost in,
say, 5− 8 days of unavailability (120− 192 hours of DDoS duration): in the
fastest case the loss rate would be 0.5/120 = 0.00417 per hour, whereas in
the slowest one it would be 0.0026. We model this with a uniform distribu-
tion U(0.0026, 0.00417). Thus, the monetary loss m due to a reduced market
share is m ∼ min[1500000, 3000000× l × U(0.0026, 0.00417)].
For the Attacker, we base our estimate on that of the Defender, adding
some uncertainty. The market share value and percentage are not affected
by uncertainty, as this information is available to both agents. However, we
model the uncertainty in the market loss rate so that the fastest one (5 days in
the Defender problem) is between 4 and 6 days in the Attacker problem and
the slowest one (8 for Defender) is between 7 and 9. Therefore, the random
distribution describing the market loss m is m ∼ min
[
1500000, 3000000 ×
l × U(α, β)
]
with α ∼ U(0.0021, 0.0031) and β ∼ U(0.00367, 0.00467).
Total costs:
The costs cd suffered by the Defender include the security control (subscrip-
tion) costs cs, and the market share lost: cd = m+ cs.
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Defender utility:
The organisation is constant risk averse over costs. Its utility function is
strategically equivalent to u(cd) = a − b exp(k(cd)). We rescale the costs to
the (0,1) range and calibrate the utility function to u(cd) =
1
e−1
[
exp
(
1 −
cd
7000000
)
− 1
]
.
Attacker earnings:
Being the sole competitor, the Attacker gains e in terms of market share is
e = m, all the market share lost by the Defender.
Attacker detection:
The Attacker runs the risk of being detected with significant costs. De-
tection probability is estimated via expert judgment at 0.2%, should the
Attacker attempt a DDoS attack. Should there be a attacks, the detection
has a binomial distribution B(a, 0.002). To add some uncertainty, we model
the detection probability for each attack through a βe(2, 998) (Its’ mean is
0.002.). Thus, we model attacker’s detection t through a random binomial
distribution that outputs detected if B(a, φ) > 0 with φ ∼ βe(2, 998), and
not detected, otherwise.
Costs when detected:
If the attack is detected, there is a further cost for the Attacker deriving from
legal issues, discredit, etc. We assume that ct | t = 1 ∼ N (2430000, 400000)
for the detection costs, where t = 1 indicates that attack is detected. If t = 0,
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there are no further costs.
Result of the attack:
Regarding costs, using a botnet to launch the DDoS attack would cost on
average 792 e per day. Overall, the Attacker gains are ca = e− ct − 792a.
Attacker utility:
The Attacker utility function is strategically equivalent to uA(ca) = (c
′
a)
ka ,
where c′a are the ca costs normalised to [0, 1], and ka is the risk proneness
parameter. We add uncertainty on ka assuming it follows a U(8, 10) distri-
bution.
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